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zation effects on 
tion* 
Ellen S. Cohn and Susan 0. White 
Much has happened in the few short years since 
the 1989 revolutions that freed the Central and 
Eastern Europe countries from Soviet domi- 
nation and started them towards democratiz- 
ation. The promise of these upheavals was 
almost as great as our surprise that they hap- 
pened at all. It is safe to say that observers 
around the world, as well as the participants 
themselves, have been watching developments 
since 1989 with a mixture of fascination and 
doubt, curious to see if 
stable democratic processes 
can take root where 
repression reigned for so 
long. The fact that the con- 
ditions for change are 
extreme, both politically 
and economically, makes 
the unfolding spectacle 
particularly powerful. 
‘The rule of law’ is a 
venerable concept in 
theories of liberal demo- 
cracy, but Western 
observers were somewhat 
startled to hear it as a rally- 
power controlled by something called the rule 
of law. 
The rule of law ideal was voiced not only 
in the streets but also in the new halls of power. 
By many accounts it continues to be a working 
ideal even for those who are struggling with 
the hard political realities produced by new 
experiences with economic uncertainties and the 
conflicts inherent in democratic politics (see, for 
example, Markovits, 1995). The prominence of 
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ing cry for these revolutionary movements. It 
was particularly striking that those who took 
to the revolutionary streets day after day 
seemed to be pursuing an ideal of freedom and 
democratic participation that did not fit any 
existing polity. The focus on the rule of law 
and constitutionalism in the rhetoric of revol- 
ution seemed to demonstrate that people who 
have been repressed by arbitrary power for 
many years still have the capacity to believe 
that power can be limited and the abuse of 
this concept in the process 
of democratization that cur- 
rently characterizes political 
activity in the former Soviet 
satellites gives rise to a 
number of questions. Who 
holds this ideal and what 
does it mean to them? Is it 
held only by the new elites 
in their activist political 
rhetoric? Or is the rule of 
law concept widely distrib- 
uted in the political beliefs 
and aspirations of ordinary 
citizens? What place does it 
have in the development of 
democratic institutions? To what extent is the 
concept ‘rule of law’ related to concepts about 
rights and duties, political freedom, and a con- 
stitutional foundation for state authority? 
As the struggle between brutal past and 
difficult present is played out, one important 
focus for research is the strength of those cul- 
tural norms that would support or undermine the 
democratization process. In particular, is there 
support for the rule of law and for legal values 
such as individual rights, fairness, equality and 
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political freedom? How necessary are support- 
ive cultural norms to the transitional process of 
democratization? Indeed, how necessary are 
they for the maintenance of a stable democracy? 
The data to be presented in this article cannot 
provide answers to the whole range of such 
questions. But perhaps they can contribute to 
a better understanding of the transition from 
repressive regime to more democratic insti- 
tutions, i.e., a better understanding of the pro- 
cesses that we refer to as democratization. 
Political theorists have long argued that the 
factors that comprise civil society are necessary 
ingredients in a stable democracy. There is con- 
siderable debate, however, over what these 
necessary factors are, where they come from, 
and how they interact with other variables over 
time. For example, it has been variously argued 
that adherence to specific values, childhood soc- 
ialization, experiences with relevant institutions, 
and level of interpersonal trust are critical to 
the maintenance of stable democracy. There is 
also debate over whether civil society variables 
are causes or effects of democratization. That 
these debates are unresolved speaks to an as 
yet inadequate empirical conceptualization of 
democracy, one which renders speculative our 
attempts to identify critical aspects of societies 
which are moving from repressive regimes 
towards democracy. 
We will not argue that the variations in 
political and legal culture variables that we 
present in this article can predict the course of 
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, 
or, in and of themselves, explain differences in 
the legal systems currently developing there. 
Instead, our purpose is primarily descriptive: to 
map the existing legal cultures in these areas 
and place them into a broader context of demo- 
cratization by comparing them to older Euro- 
pean democracies. Since our data are cross- 
sectional, from 1995 surveys, and not longitudi- 
nal, they cannot provide contemporaneous infor- 
mation about the effects of socializing experi- 
ences. Nonetheless, we will also present some 
analyses that indicate how socialization pro- 
cesses interact with stages along a continuum 
from repression to democratization. 
Specifically, the purpose of this article is 
to compare legal cultures, focusing especially 
on support for the rule of law, in the following 
ways. First, we present a macro-level cross- 
national comparison of attitudinal data from six 
democracies: Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Spain, 
France and the United States. Arrayed on a 
continuum from new to old democracy, these 
six countries approximate to a rough scale of 
democratization. The populations of three new 
democracies have until recently lived (to 
slightly varying degrees) under repressive and 
corrupt legal regimes for fifty years or more, 
while the populations of three older democracies 
have experienced legal regimes that, for varying 
lengths of time, have offered approximations to 
the rule of law. Second, we present a micro- 
level comparison of attitudinal differences 
across groups within these populations rep- 
resenting different generations and age cohorts, 
and elite versus mass socialization. 
Legal socialization and legal 
culture 
Theoretical bases 
Legal socialization refers to the processes 
through which members of a society acquire its 
legal values, such as fairness, equality, and jus- 
tice, and its norms of rule-governed behaviour. 
The primary socializers of legal values may be 
families, schools, peers, religious groups, or the 
state itself, depending on the relative influence 
of these agents in the culture and the extent to 
which a society is traditional in its orientation 
to authority. In heavily policed societies such 
as Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary during Soviet 
domination one might expect legal values to 
conform fairly rigidly to ideological definitions. 
Likewise, in societies where social control is 
less a function of the state one might expect 
more variation in legal values. 
There is considerable debate in the litera- 
ture about how and when socialization to legal 
and political values takes place (Cohn and 
White, 1990; Renshon, 1977; Sigal, 1989; Tyler, 
1990, 1994). Experiences in childhood have 
attracted extensive attention, but a number of 
social scientists from several disciplines have 
focused primarily on the adolescent/youth 
‘stage’ (variously defined) as a uniquely 
important formative period for the development 
of social and political beliefs and values (see, 
for example, Adelson and O’Neil, 1966; Delli 
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Carpini, 1989; Jennings and Niemi, 1981; 
Mannheim, 1952). It is at this stage that cogni- 
tive development reaches a critical period of 
disequilibrium, rendering the individual more 
open to new ideas and to the role-taking opport- 
unities that become the basis for moral recip- 
rocity and a sense of fairness (Cohn and White, 
1990; Kohlberg, 1969; Tapp and Levine, 1974). 
In addition, there is now a growing body of 
studies focusing on adult development and 
social learning (Sigel, 1989). Since a develop- 
mental approach to adult learning rests more 
on changing opportunities and responsibilities 
through the lifecycle than on the effects of the 
psycho-physical maturation, this literature 
argues that sociaUpolitica1 learning (or perhaps 
relearning) is a continuous process rather than 
one that is concentrated in biologically-defined, 
and peculiarly fertile, stages of development. 
For the purposes of this article, we will 
focus on the effects of political experiences, 
both in adolescence and throughout the life- 
cycle, as sources of legal values. Our context 
is democratization, and we compare populations 
from countries that have at least a twenty-year 
history of democracy with populations from 
countries that have just emerged from more than 
fifty years of political repression. Our data will 
allow us to ask to what extent the latter popu- 
lations now hold the same legal values as the 
former. We can also ask whether current ado- 
lescents and those who were adolescents during 
particularly dramatic episodes of repression and 
resistance differ from others in these popu- 
lations in their adherence to the rule of law 
ideal and other legal values. 
Legal values 
The characteristics of law under liberal demo- 
cracy are well known, although not always 
accepted across the ideological spectrum that 
supports democracy as a political ideal. The 
three most general characteristics are the pri- 
macy of law over arbitrary uses of political 
power, the primacy of the individual through 
the protection of individual rights claims, and 
the primacy of universalism over particularism 
through the abstraction of the individual ‘before 
the law’ from social characteristics. None of 
these values is absolute, but even contemporary 
‘culture wars’ over communitarian and remedial 
issues are fought over this well-defined territory. 
Our focus on the role of law in democratization 
inevitably forces the conceptual framework to 
widen because of the diverse cultures and polit- 
ical histories it must now encompass. It may 
also suggest that the predominantly Anglo- 
American/Western model of law under liberal 
democracy may be too narrow or restrictive to 
be adapted easily to less individualistic, more 
authoritarian, and more ethnically divided cul- 
tural traditions. If so, our analysis will have 
implications both for the rigidity of Western 
liberal legality and for the potential effective- 
ness of the rule of law ideal in non-Western 
countries. 
We present measures of legal values that 
comprise three components of a liberal law 
ideology: law consciousness, rights conscious- 
ness, and a calculus of fairness. ‘Law con- 
sciousness’ refers to the importance people 
attach to the moral authority of law and their 
understanding of legal obligation. ‘Rights con- 
sciousness’ is a measure of how highly people 
value the claims that can be made and protected 
under the law. The ‘calculus of fairness’ 
encompasses the valuation of both procedural 
and distributive justice, and their relative impor- 
tance, to the respondent. It must also take 
account of the weight to be given to communi- 
tarian concerns, represented by the social fair- 
ness scale. 
The first law consciousness variable is a 
scale measuring support for obedience to law, 
or lawfulness, including questions about the 
conditions under which governments and citi- 
zens should obey or break a law. A second, 
justifiable behaviours, allows us to compare the 
conceptual assessments of lawfulness with spe- 
cific instances of law-breaking. In the strict 
sense of the term, ‘the rule of law’ is a function 
of legality. The standard of legality requires 
that a legal system be composed of a set of 
formal procedures which, in turn, produces for- 
mal rules. The purpose of the insistence on 
formal procedures and rules is to protect parties 
before the law from arbitrary decisions. In 
theory, at least, formal procedures constrain the 
decision-maker from responding to the extra- 
legal characteristics of either the parties or the 
substance under dispute, and formal rules nar- 
rowly define the bases for decision. In addition, 
a felt obligation to obey the law (Tyler, 1990) 
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is often premised on a perception that these 
formal rules are just, both in their design and 
in their fair enforcement. A perception that rules 
in fact constrain those who enforce them is a 
key condition of their legitimacy for those who 
obey these rules. It is in this way that law gains 
moral authority. Together, therefore, formal pro- 
cedures and rules limit discretion both in 
decision-making and in obedience to rules. 
The questions in our lawfulness and justi- 
fiable behaviours scales are designed to elicit a 
respondent’s propensity to approve departures 
from a strict adherence to law (Gibson and 
Caldeira, 1996). Such departures can stem from 
several sources. A respondent may perceive the 
law or its enforcement as lacking moral auth- 
ority to some degree. Some respondents may 
adhere strictly to law out of personal rigidity. 
Also, unstable social and political conditions 
can put a strain on people’s willingness to trust 
the rule of law. In addition to their perceptions 
of the moral authority of the law, therefore, 
issues of security may also affect respondents’ 
propensity to approve departures from a strict 
adherence to law. The possible effects of these 
three factors can be inferred from other analyses 
of these data, as we discuss below. Use of the 
two scales allows us to differentiate between a 
conceptual analysis of reasons for obeying or 
violating the law, and justifications for specific 
instances of law-breaking. 
Rights consciousness is an ‘awareness’ and 
a ‘set of expectations about how citizens ought 
to be treated by major social and political insti- 
tutions’ (Gibson and Duch, 1993, p. 242). It is 
measured by a series of nine questions (see 
appendix) asking respondents to indicate the 
importance to them of a range of rights claims, 
using the reference term ‘right’ in five ques- 
tions, ‘freedom’ in three questions, and ‘equal- 
ity’ in one question. The rights claims range 
from freedom to express political views to a 
right to abortion. The rights consciousness scale 
is noteworthy in this comparative context 
(Gibson and Duch, 1993) because it includes 
not only strictly political rights (e.g., to express 
political views) but also social rights (e.g., to 
a job and a clean environment). Political rights 
such as freedom of speech are important legal 
values because law is presumed to control state 
power by protecting political freedom. Without 
political freedom, the possibilities for challeng- 
ing state power and for open competition in 
contests for power are severely limited or non- 
existent. It was the growing capacity of people 
to exercise political freedom - especially in the 
expression of resistance through massive street 
demonstrations that were not effectively chal- 
lenged by the governments in question - that 
signalled to the world the weakening and 
approaching demise of authoritarian state con- 
trol and the reality and strength of the 1989 
revolutionary movements. Social rights also 
have a special place in the particular instance 
of democratization that we are analysing. The 
new constitutions of Eastern and Central Europe 
seek to institutionalize the social guarantees of 
the old social order, including rights to a clean 
environment, to education, to a job, and to leis- 
ure (Eastern Constitutional Review; see also 
Markovits, 1995). In Western Europe, the social 
democratic tradition has often dominated poli- 
tics, with the consequence that claims to social 
rights are common although not always insti- 
tutionalized. In the United States, the legaliz- 
ation of such rights by giving them consti- 
tutional status is uncommon and perhaps 
unpopular. Social and economic change. 
especially the appearance of the ‘new poor’ in 
the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, 
may make social rights a particularly volatile 
factor in rights consciousness across these popu- 
lations (White, Batt and Lewis, 1993). We 
argue, however, that legalizing social rights 
claims runs counter to the fundamental individu- 
alism of liberal legality - not to the social goals 
and egalitarian leanings of liberal democracy 
per se, but to the sense in which the individual 
rather than the group is the focus of legalized 
(and especially constitutionalized) rights claims. 
This latter issue arises clearly in the second 
rights-oriented variable that we report: i.e., 
rights for what we have called excluded groups. 
In separate questions (see appendix), respon- 
dents were asked whether their country should 
guarantee a job to ‘foreigners’, ‘gypsies’ 
(‘minorities’ in the US), and women. In addition 
to its implications for exclusionary politics, this 
variable tests the extent to which rights con- 
sciousness, when applied to specific claims, is 
oriented more to individual or to group claims. 
In liberal democracy, legal theory abstracts the 
individual from social characteristics. Since par- 
ties before the law are envisioned as moral 
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beings bearing the rights of citizenship, it is not 
only cases that must be treated alike but the 
parties that bring them as well. This legal like- 
ness is not a principle of social equality but, 
rather, of neutrality and impartiality across par- 
ties, who appear before the law as unequals in 
many respects but are nonetheless treated as 
equals before the law. In effect, the law ignores 
the social sources of inequality (e.g., wealth, 
gender, class, race) and instead treats parties as 
abstract individuals: i.e., as individuals without 
the social markings of inequality. This legal 
abstraction of the individual from social charac- 
teristics is given a political context when rights 
for excluded groups are considered. We expect 
that the implied universalism in viewing the 
individual as an abstract entity may be alien to 
some of the political contexts of our study, 
especially in identity-based politics such as 
the ethnic particularism of Eastern and Cen- 
tral Europe. 
Our third rights-oriented variable tests the 
strength of a commitment to political rights in 
the abstract by asking respondents about specific 
situations where political freedom must be 
weighed against the threat of disorder. Four 
questions (see appendix) form a scale of ‘liberty 
versus order’ that forces the respondents to 
choose between individual liberty and social 
order. This scale highlights the different ways 
in which the power of law can be concep- 
tualized. On the one hand, law can provide 
security against disruption and instability. On 
the other hand, the rule of law can act as a 
barrier against arbitrary, personalistic, and 
repressive behaviour by those in power. The 
positive force of law arises from its capacity 
to facilitate democratic processes by protecting 
individual rights, the free expression of opi- 
nions, and an open flow of information. Its 
negative force protects against the potential for 
anarchy in the face of social disintegration and 
an excessive push for freedom. Together, these 
polar aspects of the rule of law reflect the cen- 
tral importance of the relationship between the 
individual and government in any conceptualiz- 
ation of law. In forcing respondents to choose 
between individual liberty and social order, 
these questions allow us to see how respondents 
modify (if they do) their commitment to rights 
in the abstract when faced with specific political 
contexts that suggest strong reasons for sacrific- 
ing political freedom for social order. We 
expect respondents to vary along a liberty-to- 
order continuum depending on their experiences 
with political instability, and perhaps on the 
kind and length of their familiarity with politi- 
cal openness. 
The calculus of fairness is a third approach 
to liberal legality involving the specific judg- 
ments that individuals make when they decide 
issues of justice. These justice judgments (Lind 
and Tyler, 1988) have often been understood 
within a framework defined by a dichotomy 
between distributive and procedural factors. Dis- 
tributive factors can include a range of social 
justice issues, or simply the outcomes of various 
political decision-making processes, including 
legal decisions. 
Our first justice judgment variable rep- 
resents the importance the respondents place on 
procedural justice (Thibault and Walker, 1975), 
measured by four questions concerning how one 
is treated by governmental authority (see 
appendix). While legality (in the sense of formal 
rules and procedures) is not itself a moral prin- 
ciple, there is a kind of ethic inherent in the 
concept, one component of which is the due 
process of law. The strict meaning of due pro- 
cess is simply the process that is due a party 
under the law, but that meaning has been elev- 
ated in Anglo-American law to imply a standard 
of fairness in legal proceedings. In this elevated 
sense, due process refers to the treatment that 
is due to a moral being bearing the rights of 
(normally) citizenship. Thus procedural fairness 
implies both a standard of treatment and a moral 
claim to that treatment by the partykitizen. 
Lind and Tyler (1988) have taken this con- 
cept into the realm of social and political behav- 
iour by finding differences in responses to pro- 
cedural versus distributive justice, and 
particularly in the relative strength of procedural 
justice in respondents’ evaluations of their 
experiences with the law. This research has 
shown, for example, that fair procedures bolster 
the legitimacy of political and legal institutions 
(Tyler, 1988, 1994). The power of this variable 
has been amply demonstrated (Lind and Tyler, 
1988; Lind, Huo and Tyler, 1994; Tyler, 1988, 
1994), but most applications have been in the 
context of American experiences with law. In 
the same set of questions about encounters with 
governmental authority that assesses the impor- 
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tance of procedural justice, we introduced a 
measure of distributive justice by asking respon- 
dents an additional question about the impor- 
tance of the outcome. We also report a measure 
of the relative importance of procedural and 
distributive justice (computed by a difference 
score). In addition, we report country means on 
a scale of fairness defined in communitarian 
terms, in which higher scores indicate a sensi- 
tivity to the effects of a law on ‘most people’. 
A comparison of the relative importance of pro- 
cedural justice with the fairness score provides 
what we call a calculus of fairness for each 
respondent in which procedural and distributive 
justice judgments, which focus on the individ- 
ual, are weighed against a more social or com- 
munitarian sense of fairness. We expect to see 
a further demonstration of the importance of 
procedural fairness in the European context, 
particularly among those who have recently 
experienced repressive regimes. We also expect 
to see greater support for social fairness in 
the East. 
Sources of legal values 
As a means of determining the extent to which 
these legal values are anchored in the belief 
systems of the populations we surveyed, we 
also measured certain fundamental aspects of 
the respondents’ orientation to the political and 
social worlds in which they live. These meas- 
ures are reported as three variables (see 
appendix). The first of these variables indicates 
whether a respondent is more inclined towards 
individualism or collectivism, a conceptual con- 
tinuum originally introduced by cultural psy- 
chologists (Triandis, 1990) and often used, in 
various versions, by many social scientists (see, 
for example, Bierbrauer, 1994; Gibson and Cal- 
deira, 1996). Using eight items devised for this 
study (see appendix) that force a choice 
between group values such as family, society 
or nation, and individualistic values, respon- 
dents are located on a continuum anchored by 
individualism at one end and collectivism at the 
other. In the context of legal values, preference 
for individual claims over the interests of the 
community fits conceptually with the abstraction 
of the individual from social characteristics and 
the universalism inherent in the legal concepts 
of liberal democracy. Collectivism, on the other 
hand, suggests both the subordination of the 
individual to communitarian values and a pref- 
erence for traditional ways of life in which the 
authority of family and religion is primary. 
Another fundamental dimension in a per- 
son’s belief system is reflected in our social 
conservatism scale, which measures the tend- 
ency to accept or reject social change. Accept- 
ance of social change has often been viewed as 
a characteristic of the modernizing society, 
while resistance is assumed to signal an anti- 
modernist stance towards a changing world. 
Without getting into the considerable com- 
plexities of the debate over the requisites of 
modernization, we can relate this simple distinc- 
tion to attitudes towards law. All the legal 
values we have measured fit the model of law 
that is inherent in liberal democracy, which in 
turn tends to elevate individual rights claims as 
against the social status quo. Particularly in the 
more political dimension of legality, people who 
support these legal values are less likely to 
agree to ‘adapt to the rules of society rather 
than fighting them’ or ‘accept the flaws of exist- 
ing authority’ or ‘accept the way society works’ 
than are those who do not support these values. 
The latter are more socially conservative than 
the former and their social conservatism leads 
them to resist change, perhaps especially the 
kind of change brought about through an instru- 
mental use of law to protect individual rights 
claims. 
A third dimension of support for liberal 
legal values may be a reflection of personality 
characteristics that indicate a more or less rigid 
approach to one’s social and political world. 
This kind of rigidity has been studied by many 
social psychologists but the most frequently 
adopted measure is the dogmatism scale 
developed by Rokeach (1960). We have used 
four items from Rokeach’s dogmatism scale 
(see appendix) to determine whether this kind 
of propensity towards personal rigidity with 
respect to social and political life identifies 
those who are less likely to be open to other 
points of view and who are therefore less sup- 
portive of the freedoms protected as political 
and social rights by the law. This kind of meas- 
ure, while closely related conceptually to both 
low support of individualism and social con- 
servatism, reflects in particular a personality that 
is inclined to react to any issue in black versus 
white, either/or terms. 
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While we do not here attempt a causal 
analysis, we would argue that these three meas- 
ures can be understood conceptually as sources 
of legal values. Each of these scales tells us 
something about the extent to which a respon- 
dent holds fundamental attitudes towards politi- 
cal and social life that would incline a person 
towards or against acceptance of legal values. 
The values we have chosen to measure are 
premised on liberal democratic principles such 
as universalism in the application of law, 
respect for citizen rights, equality before the 
law, and the limitation of authority. Acceptance 
of such values depends in part on a person’s 
capacity for independence, even-handedness and 
openness to change. Our argument is that one’s 
orientation to the social order - that is, to norms 
of authority and obedience, and to issues that 
pit the welfare of the group against individual 
autonomy and that emphasize individual versus 
group responsibility - may also affect one’s 
willingness to accept legal values that test 
these orientations. 
Legal values and socialization 
How are these legal values related to socializ- 
ation? Since we do not have longitudinal data 
with which to test hypotheses about attitude 
change through the process of transition from 
dominance by a repressive regime towards the 
establishment of democratic institutions, we 
shall instead pay close attention to comparisons 
between legal cultures that are at different 
stages of democratization. Several basic ques- 
tions will be uppermost throughout these analy- 
ses. Are there macro-level differences in legal 
values between countries that result in a scale 
ordering of legal cultures that approximates to 
our rough scale of democratization? Are there 
significant differences in support for legal 
values between populations that have recently 
experienced repressive legal and political 
regimes (i.e. Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary) and 
populations that are living under non-repressive 
regimes (Spain, France, United States)? If so, 
are these differences related to attitudes that we 
have identified as sources of legal values? 
We expect to find such differences, and 
hypothesize that they will be in the direction 
of more support for liberal legal values in popu- 
lations that do not have recent experience under 
a repressive legal regime. We also hypothesize 
that there will be differences between support 
for values in the abstract and support for spe- 
cific instances, and that the differential will be 
greater in those populations now undergoing 
transitional social and economic instability. Gib- 
son and Duch (1993) found that rights con- 
sciousness is higher in newer than in older 
democracies, suggesting that the newer demo- 
cracies in our analysis may have a higher rights 
consciousness than expected on the basis of the 
socialization processes their populations experi- 
enced under repressive regimes. 
We will also ask if it is possible to detect 
micro-level legal culture differences within 
populations that suggest differential effects on 
the democratization process depending on how 
one has been socialized to legal values. In this 
analysis, we will pay particular attention to the 
hypothesis discussed above which suggests that 
those who experience critical events relating to 
repression and resistance during their ado- 
lescence or early youth will develop a distinct 
generational response. If such age cohorts can 
be identified, does the effect persist long enough 
to influence later attitudes and behaviours? 
Because the adolescent hypothesis emphasizes 
the state of disequilibrium in adolescence 
(Kohlberg, 1969) which is particularly vulner- 
able to conditions of conflict and receptive to 
role-taking opportunities (Cohn and White, 
1990), we will look particularly at the possible 
effects of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, the 
student revolts and ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968, 
and the revolutionary upheavals of 1989. 
Research design 
The analysis that is presented in this article is 
based upon national surveys conducted in Bul- 
garia ( n  = 83 l) ,  Poland (n  = 824), Hungary 
(n  = 786), Spain ( n  = 775), France (n  = 762), 
and the United States ( n  = 810). Face-to-face 
interviews were conducted in Bulgaria, Poland, 
Hungary, Spain and France in the spring of 
1995 and telephone interviews were conducted 
in the United States in the winter of 1995- 
1996. In each country, random national samples 
of participants aged eighteen or older were 
selected. As is usual in these surveys, slightly 
more females than males participated (52.1% in 
Bulgaria, 59.4% in Poland, 53.9% in Hungary, 
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55.1% in Spain, 50.5% in France, and 50.6% 
in the United States). The largest percentage 
of respondents were Roman Catholic in Poland 
(96.1%) and Spain (80.8%). Of the Hungarian 
sample, 49.1 % described themselves as Roman 
Catholic, 24.7% as atheists and 11.5% as Prot- 
estants. In Bulgaria, the largest percentage of 
respondents were Eastern Orthodox (5 I .4%); 
32.5% described themselves as Muslim. In 
France, the largest percentage of respondents 
were Roman Catholic (69.9%), with 19.5% 
describing themselves as atheists. In the United 
States, the largest percentage of the respondents 
were Protestant (50.2%). Technical documents 
on the methodology are available from the 
authors. 
Legal cultures and 
democratization 
In this section, we provide a basic description 
of the legal cultures of our six countries. The 
data consist of mean responses, by country, to 
the questions we have discussed above. As 
Table 1 indicates, there are a number of strong 
country differences. Whether they form interest- 
ing patterns is the first question for discussion 
below. 
As mentioned above, we have hypothesized 
an ordering of the six countries along a rough 
scale of democratization. Our criteria are drawn 
less from democratic theory than from the his- 
torical fact base that describes the chronological 
age of the six democratic regimes, which is 
simply a measure of how much experience each 
has had with democratic politics. Our point of 
reference is Western democracy, or the model 
of liberal democracy in the West, not because 
of a normative preference so much as a practical 
desire to adopt the model with the most cur- 
rency and, therefore, about which we have the 
most knowledge. On this basis, the oldest 
democracy is, obviously, the United States, fol- 
lowed by France and Spain. 
Since Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary each 
began its formal ‘democratizing’ in the same 
year, our criterion of experience with demo- 
cratic politics becomes even less precise when 
applied to them. However, if one looks at the 
relative proximity of each of these countries to 
Western democracies - through political, econ- 
omic and cultural contact - it seems clear that 
Hungary has had the longest and closest contact 
with the West, followed by Poland and then 
Bulgaria (Held, 1992; Weil, 1993; White, Batt 
and Lewis, 1993). The Hungarian Government 
was, since 1968 or so, the most open to Western 
economic involvement and the most pragmatic 
politically; Poland was considerably more rigid 
politically and less open to Western ideas; Bul- 
garia was remote from the West culturally as 
well as politically and economically. Since the 
scale of democratization that results from this 
ordering is simply a heuristic for our purposes, 
we have not been concerned with more precise 
or detailed comparisons. 
The first set of data is comprised of the 
mean responses to the legal values variables. 
These are law consciousness, including the law- 
fulness scale and the justifiable behaviours 
scale; rights consciousness, including the rights 
consciousness scale, rights for excluded groups, 
and the liberty/order scale; and the calculus of 
fairness, including the importance of procedural 
justice scale, the distributive justice score, the 
relative importance of procedural justice score, 
and the social fairness scale. The first point to 
note is that our heuristic scale of democratiz- 
ation fits some of the data. The relative impor- 
tance of procedural justice and the importance 
of distributive justice fit the scale fairly well, 
as does the preference of liberty over order. 
There is little variation at all across the six 
countries for rights consciousness and the 
importance of procedural justice, however. And 
the data are rather curvilinear for rights for 
excluded groups. 
With respect to law consciousness, mean 
scores on the lawfulness scale indicate that none 
of these populations is strongly committed to 
abiding by the law in all circumstances. In fact, 
lawfulness barely rises above the midpoint of 
the scale across all the countries. These ques- 
tions are designed to force the respondent to 
face difficult choices involved in law enforce- 
ment, and it is clear that many can find reasons 
to avoid strict adherence to law. On the other 
hand, mean scores on the four-point justifiable 
behaviours scale indicate a higher level of law- 
fulness when the moral authority of law is 
invoked. This more specific measure asks 
whether it is morally justifiable to engage in 
each of five different law-breaking behaviours. 
0 UNESCO 1997. 
Legal socialization effects on democratization 159 


















Perception of economy 
























































































































































Note: The superscripts are ordered so that a is the highest mean and d is the lowest mean for each variable. Overall 
there were significant multivariate effects of country on the legal values (F(40, 20393.72) = 353.58, p < 0.001, 
Wilks lambda=O.IO), the social beliefs (F(15, 13104.78)= 83.81, p < 0.001, Wilks lambda=0.78) and the two 
democratization variables (F(10,  9066) = 99.19, p < 0.001, Wilks lambda= 0.81). The superscripts above are based 
on Scheffe post hoc tests conducted on the variables with significant univariate Fs. 
It reveals that respondents in all the countries 
distinguish between law violations depending 
on their social or political context. The distri- 
bution of responses across the scale suggests 
that respondents in each country are ambivalent 
about paying taxes and taking government bene- 
fits illegally. On the other hand, there is a polar- 
ized consensus against the moral justifiability 
of stealing and accepting bribes both within and 
across the countries. We believe that interpret- 
ations of responses to more conceptual ques- 
tions about reasons for departing from strict 
adherence to law, such as those in the law- 
fulness scale, can be enhanced in the light of 
responses to questions about specific areas of 
law-breaking as well. 
It is clear that rights are highly valued in 
all six countries. Although rights consciousness 
is somewhat lower in the three countries that 
have recently emerged from repressive rule, 
there appears to be a strong consensus about 
the importance of rights across populations that 
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Gypsy candidate campaigning for senatorial elections in Romania, 1990. AtgerlEditing 
have had notably different experiences with law. 
It is clear that claiming rights is one aspect of 
liberal democracy that finds fertile ground in 
the newly ‘liberalized’ populations. We can see 
some variation in commitment to rights if we 
look at instances of claims to social rights in 
which the claimant is specified, however. The 
commitment decreases in all countries when 
questions are asked about rights to a job for 
excluded groups. Table 2 compares responses 
to the item from the rights consciousness scale 
that asks about ‘right to a job’ with the three 
items from the excluded groups scale that ask 
the same question specifying foreigners, women 
or gypsies (minorities in the United States). 
Commitment to the right to a job for excluded 
groups clearly weakens in all countries, in some 
cases precipitously, except when the recipient 
is a woman. This finding indicates that rights 
entitlement is devalued when the claimant is 
perceived to be outside the normal group. 
Returning our attention to the means values 
in Table 1, we see a similar weakness in com- 
mitment to political rights when we look at 
these claims in political contexts that include 
social disruption. The four items that make up 
the liberty versus order scale refer to ‘free 
speech’, ‘extremist political views’, and demon- 
strations by ‘radical groups’. The mean scores 
for this scale do not reach much above the 
midpoint for Western countries and are all well 
below the midpoint for the Eastern countries. 
Thus, despite the high valuation of political 
rights in general across all countries, this strong 
commitment is decidedly weaker when these 
rights are put to the test in political contests 
that contain the potential for disruption. 
There is also interesting variation in our 
calculus of fairness measures. Procedural and 
distributive justice are even more highly valued 
across all countries than rights claims. Since all 
three are claimant-oriented, and do not specify 
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TABLE 2. Frequencies and row percentages for the right to a job and the rights for excluded groups items for the 
six countries 
Measures 
Right to a job 
Rating 
Not very Very 
important important 



















16 (2.0%) 44 (5.4%) 
15 (1.8%) 66 (8.1%) 
18 (2.3%) 71 (9.1%) 
7 (0.9%) 60 (7.8%) 
5 (0.7%) 57 (7.5%) 
64 (8.1%) 65 (8.3%) 
Agree 
strongly Foreigners should not be guaranteed a 
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31 (3.8%) 28 (3.4%) 29 (3.5%) 74 (9.0%) 662 (80.3%) 
21 (2.6%) 28 (3.4%) 38 (4.6%) 167 (20.4%) 565 (69%) 
25 (3.2%) 19 (2.4%) 30 (3.9%) 183 (23.5%) 522 (67%) 
12 (1.6%) 25 (3.2%) 24 (3.1%) 192 (24.9%) 517 (67.1%) 
16 (2.1%) 29 (3.8%) 34 (4.5%) 148 (19.5%) 531 (70.1%) 
37 (4.6%) 75 (9.4%) 37 (4.6%) 311 (38.9%) 340 (42.5%) 
Agree Disagree 
Gypsieshinorities should not be strongly strongly 






62 (7.5%) 58 (7%) 108 (13.1%) 163 (19.7%) 435 (52.7%) 
155 (19%) 116 (14.2%) 141 (17.3%) 214 (26.2%) 190 (23.3%) 
34 (4.4%) 26 (3.4%) 63 (8.1%) 212 (27.3%) 441 (56.8%) 
20 (2.6%) 42 (5.4%) 64 (8.3%) 290 (37.6%) 355 (46%) 
53 (6.6%) I18 (14.8%) 55 (6.9%) 318 (39.8%) 254 (31.8%) 
Note: Chi square analyses resulted in significant effects for the right to a job (X2(20) = 390.24, p < O.oooO1, 
eta2 = 0.07) and not guaranteeing the right to a job to foreigners (X2(20) = 803.04, p < O.oooO1, eta’ = 0.12). women 
(Xz(20) = 344.41, p < 0.00001, eta’ = 0.03), and gypsies (France and the United States not included in analysis) 
(X2(12)=432.14, p < O.OOOO1, etaz =0.1 I). 
contexts that might make them more problem- ever. Procedural justice is discounted, compared 
atic, these high valuations are not surprising. to distributive justice, more in the new demo- 
Our comparison of the importance of procedural cracies than in the older democracies. It is strik- 
and distributive justice, by a difference score ingly evident that the United States values pro- 
that indicates the relative importance of pro- cedural far more than distributive justice. 
cedural justice, yields interesting variation, how- Distributive justice carries more weight in those 
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countries that have lived under a collectivist 
political ideology for so long, and are also fac- 
ing the economic burdens and uncertainties of 
market liberalization. The social fairness scale 
adds a different perspective to the calculus of 
fairness because it is not oriented to individual 
claimants, whether for procedural or distributive 
claims. It is interesting to note that all countries 
give lower ratings to fairness that is defined in 
terms of appeals to egalitarian concepts (‘protect 
both the strong and the weak’) and what ‘most 
people’ want than to fairness defined in terms 
of individually oriented claims. Social fairness 
is more highly rated among the former commu- 
nist countries than among the Western demo- 
cracies. The calculus of fairness in the United 
States is particularly individualistic. 
For basic social beliefs, all countries have 
mean scores towards the collectivism end of the 
individualism-to-collectivism continuum. While 
it is not surprising that American respondents 
lean more towards individualism than do the 
other respondents, the fact that their support for 
individualism does not rise above the midpoint 
of our scale is puzzling. This scale, which was 
created for this survey, may overstate the ten- 
sion between the individual and the group by 
characterizing individualist stances in extreme 
terms. In any case, it is important to note that 
strong support for individualism is lacking in 
all the countries. Even though the three East 
and Central European countries are distinctly 
less individualistic than the two West European 
populations, this finding leads one to question 
how necessary support for individualistic legal 
values is to a democratic legal culture. Since a 
lower support for individualism is also a higher 
support for collectivism, this finding is parti- 
cularly intriguing when taken in conjunction 
with the uniformly high support across these 
countries for legal values that focus on the indi- 
vidual claimant, such as rights consciousness 
and procedural justice. 
Another aspect of our respondents’ social 
belief systems also sheds light on their generally 
tentative or cautious support for politically- 
embedded legal values. All the countries tend 
to cluster around the mid-point in the social 
conservatism scale; only Poland is above it. 
Since this scale measures reaction to social 
change, we can infer that the respondents have 
a generally moderate response to social change 
and are not unduly alarmed by its assorted 
manifestations in their social and political 
worlds. Except in Spain and the United States, 
respondents also tend to be dogmatic, although 
not extremely so. These two variables provide 
support for the inference that most of these 
countries have a moderately conservative 
approach to social and political life. 
Finally, we asked all respondents about 
their perception of the state of the economy 
and whether they were satisfied with ‘how 
democracy works’ in their country. As Table 1 
shows, all countries gave responses that were 
more negative than positive. Hungary is the 
exception to a roughly linear trend towards opti- 
mism on the economy across our democratiz- 
ation scale. Respondents’ satisfaction with 
democracy follows the same general trend, but 
is significantly more negative than their percep- 
tion of the economy. Given these somewhat 
negative assessments of their current economic 
and political situations, it is not surprising that 
support for politically embedded legal values 
such as rights for excluded groups, liberty and 
lawfulness is lower than claims-oriented values 
such as rights consciousness and the importance 
of procedural justice. 
Overall, there are clear country differences 
but these are not always related to our demo- 
cratization scale. We now turn to other kinds 
of analyses to determine whether there are indi- 
cators of different socialization processes across 
the six countries. 
Socialization of subgroups 
The generational hypothesis 
Since all our data have been collected at the 
same time, we have no obvious basis for draw- 
ing inferences about changes in attitudes or 
ideological stances across our several popu- 
lations. Finding socialization effects is some- 
times a matter of specifying critical subgroups 
within a population, however. Therefore, we 
have pursued a strategy of identifying subgroups 
that are potentially fertile sources of differences 
in socialization processes. 
We start with age. The so-called ‘gener- 
ational hypothesis’ has been discussed in the 
social science literature for many years (Delli 
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Carpini, 1989; Jennings and Niemi, 1981; 
Mannheim, 1952; Weil, 1993). There are sev- 
eral ways to formulate this hypothesis, but it 
most frequently involves the identification of 
age cohorts that are linked with major historical 
events, usually at a point in the life course 
labelled variously adolescence or youth. For 
example, one might identify those who were in 
late adolescence or early adulthood during the 
Vietnam War, or World War 11, or at the time 
of the Kennedy assassination. Karl Mannheim 
(1952) put the generational label on this identi- 
fication of critical age cohorts with the sugges- 
tion that particular experiences can mark an 
entire ‘generation unit’, making it ideologically 
distinct throughout its life course both from 
other age cohorts and from others of the same 
age who did not have these experiences. This 
generational ‘defining moment’ (in the current 
vernacular), Mannheim (and others) believed 
coincides with a critical period in one’s youth: 
The possibility of really questioning and reflecting on 
things only emerges at the point where personal exper- 
imentation with life begins - round about the age of 17, 
sometimes a little earlier and sometimes a little later. It 
is only then that life’s problems begin to be located in 
a ‘present’ and are experienced as such. That level of 
data and attitudes which social change has rendered prob- 
lematical, and which therefore requires reflection, has 
now been reached; for the first time, one lives in the 
‘present’. (Mannheim, 1952, p. 115) 
This emphasis on youth cohorts, while 
explained differently from different disciplinary 
perspectives (compare Mannheim with, e.g., 
Jennings and Niemi, 1981, or Kohlberg, 1969) 
has been pervasive in the socialization literature, 
especially as it deals with various forms of the 
generational hypothesis. 
Because we are interested in legal socializ- 
ation processes within our populations, we com- 
pared generational age cohorts both within and 
across the six countries. We identified four 
youth cohorts’ in each country that meet 
Mannheim’s definition of ‘generational units’. 
Each cohort was between the ages of 13 and 
21 at critical event points in time: 1947 (World 
War I1 and the post-war Soviet repression), 
1956 (the Hungarian uprising), 1968 (the 
‘Prague Spring’ and student rebellions), and 
1989 (revolutionary upheavals in the former 
Soviet satellite countries). We added a fifth 
youth cohort (those who were 13-21 in 1978) 
to represent the remainder of the population 
even though that period had not produced a 
critical event (other than the death of Franco) 
of the same historical magnitude. In order to 
make sense of this mass of information, we 
have chosen to discuss the comparisons in terms 
of the number of statistically significant differ- 
ences between the cohorts, across the countries. 
Table 3 below summarizes this information, 
including differences over legal values, the 
social beliefs that we have called sources of 
legal values, and perceptions of the economy 
and satisfaction with democracy. 
Even though there are significant differ- 
ences among the cohorts in these values and 
beliefs, there is no pattern of response that parti- 
cularly distinguishes one ‘generation unit’ from 
the others. Most of the differences between the 
age cohorts involve the youngest and the oldest 
cohorts, indicating that generational effects may 
be occurring. Whether these are occurring 
because of normal rebellious disputes between 
youths and older generations, or because of nor- 
mal maturation patterns, or because of gener- 
ational imprinting during critical events, cannot 
be determined from these data, however. It is 
possible that cohort effects existed at one time 
but did not persist into 1995 (or, more 
importantly, 1989). It is also possible that the 
trauma of these critical events was so extreme 
as to affect the entire population deeply, regard- 
less of age or developmental stage. 
We can see a pattern across the countries, 
however. The bar graph in Figure 1 below indi- 
cates that there is a curvilinear relationship in 
which the number of significant differences 
among cohorts increases from Bulgaria to 
Poland to Hungary to Spain, and then decreases 
sharply with France and the United States. 
There is at least a hint in this relationship of 
an increasing amount of disagreement over legal 
values as populations become more involved 
with the issues of democratization. This kind of 
disagreement pervades their fundamental social 
beliefs as well, indicating that these age groups 
may be rubbing against each other increasingly 
as political change grows nearer. The fact that 
Spain remains high in differentiation across age 
cohorts suggests that this youngest of the older 
democracies is still at a peak of normative inter- 
cohort disagreement or activity as it learns to 
contend with conflictful democratic politics. In 
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TABLE 3. Number of significant differences among the youth cohorts for legal values, social beliefs, and 
democratization 
Measures Countries 





4 7 9 12 9 5 
6 3 14 15 8 0 
0 0 3 2 2 3 
10 10 26 29 19 8 
Note: The significant differences are based on the results of Scheffe post hoc tests. The multivariate effects of 
youth cohorts aged 13-21 years from 1947, 1956, 1968, 1978, and 1989 on legal values, social beliefs, and 
democratization, were significant for each country. The legal values include lawfulness, justifiable behaviours, rights 
consciousness, rights for excluded groups, liberty, procedural justice, distributive justice, relative procedural justice, 
and social fairness. The social beliefs include individualism, dogmatism, and social conservatism. Democratization 
includes perception of the economy and satisfaction with democracy. 
Bubaria bland thaary Spain France USA 
FIGURE I:  Number of significant differences among 
youth cohorts based on 13-21 year-olds in 1947, 1956, 
1968, 1978 and 1989. 
these terms, France is no longer in its demo- 
cratic youth, and the United States is becoming 
downright stodgy. In any case, these data appear 
to reflect a progressive differentiation over legal 
values and related beliefs in a curvilinear pat- 
tern as a population moves away from 
repression towards the establishment of demo- 
cratic processes and institutions. Perhaps we can 
think of it as a developing normative energy 
that is needed for the initiation of democracy 
but that dissipates when democracy reaches 
maturity. 
The number of significant differences over 
basic values and beliefs among the actual youth 
cohorts is lowest for Bulgaria and Poland, at 
one end of the democratization scale, and for 
the United States at the other end. This suggests 
a greater degree of consensus across generations 
in those countries that are in the earliest and 
latest stages of democratization. Conversely, 
normative disagreement is greatest where the 
battle is joined, i.e., where democratic insti- 
tutions are newly established, providing public 
space for democratic contests that bring out 
debate and different points of view. 
Elite/mass socialization 
In addition to this straightforward cohort com- 
parison, we divided the country populations into 
two groups by level of education. Those with 
some university training and above we desig- 
nated ‘elites’ and those with no university train- 
ing and below we designated ‘masses’.* 
Although educational level has often been 
shown to be positively correlated with liberal- 
ism - e.g., in support for democratic values and 
level of tolerance (Gibson and Caldeira, 1996; 
Gibson and Duch, 1993) - we would argue that 
it should also be interpreted as having a broader 
socializing effect. The distinction between those 
with university training and those without 
reflects different socializing experiences, both 
in the educational process and in subsequent 
occupational responsibilities. That is, those with 
university training have experienced a greater 
consensus about the basic questions (although 
not about answers to specific issues) than those 
who have not been through university. We 
further argue that this division accurately 
reflects respondents’ eventual political and 
economic locations within their society and, 
therefore, their actual power differential as well. 
In short, there is likely to be greater commonal- 
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FIGURE 2 :  Number of significant differences for elites” 
and massesh based on youth cohorts from 1947, 1956, 
1968, 1978 and 1989. 
Elites have at least some university education. 
Masses have either no education or education below univemity level. 
ity of experience among those in social 
locations filled with people who have had uni- 
versity training than across all levels of edu- 
cation. 
The number of significant differences 
among youth cohorts within the masses and 
among youth cohorts within the elites is 
presented in Figure 2 above. Figure 2 provides 
two additional pieces of information about the 
socializing process. First, there are more sig- 
nificant normative differences among age 
cohorts who are non-elites than among elite 
age cohorts in all countries except France. And 
second, there are more significant normative dif- 
ferences among the elite age cohorts in the 
West than among elite age cohorts in the East. 
The fact that non-elites are more likely to dis- 
agree with each other about values and social 
beliefs than elites is probably to be expected, 
we would argue, given the relative commonality 
produced over time through higher education. 
Experiences during university training as well 
as the relatively restricted cultural focus of that 
kind of intellectual milieu are likely to circum- 
scribe attitudes towards a broad consensus about 
basic questions, even though these elites might 
disagree about specific issues. University train- 
ing is also likely to track recipients towards 
elite roles in their society so that later experi- 
ences tend to reinforce cultural consensus within 
this subgroup. It is particularly interesting that 
elites in the three former Soviet satellites mani- 
fest almost no normative disagreement among 
age cohorts, in contrast to both elites and non- 
elites in the Western countries. This finding 
suggests that the progressive differentiation over 
time in these new democracies was taking place 
among the less educated masses, and that the 
best educated in these populations (and also, 
most likely, those in elite roles) held relatively 
uniform values throughout the long years of 
Soviet domination and even to 1995. It is also 
possible, of course, that the uniformity of elites 
in the new democracies developed after 1989, 
since all we know from these data is from 1995. 
Conclusion 
The rule of law ideal in the West has meant at 
least the following: the primacy of law over 
arbitrary uses of political power, the primacy 
of the individual through the protection of indi- 
vidual rights claims, and the primacy of univer- 
salism over particularism through the abstrac- 
tion of the individual ‘before the law’ from 
social characteristics. This liberal legal ideology 
undoubtedly faces modification when it is car- 
ried like a banner beyond the streets and mar- 
ketplaces of revolution into the institutions of 
new democracies. As a banner, it does not 
describe accurately the actual legal practices of 
even its originators in Anglo-American law, let 
alone those of the many nations that would 
claim to have modelled their constitutions on 
it. But it is often assumed that the populations 
of countries that claim the label ‘liberal demo- 
cracy’ support these principles of the rule of 
law ideal, and that populations in transitional 
societies must come to support these principles 
if they are ever to succeed in establishing and 
maintaining stable liberal democracies. That is 
why a comparison of legal cultures across new 
and older democracies is important: to test our 
assumptions about the role of legal values in the 
normative attitudinal structures of populations 
across this spectrum. 
What is the normative status of public 
values such as liberty, justice and equality, and 
of public acts such as asserting rights and being 
held accountable under the law? How alike or 
different are valuations by the populations 
across the spectrum of democratization? The 
older democracies are generally more liberal 
than the new democracies, both in their level 
of support for legal values and in the social 
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beliefs that underlie them. We would argue that 
this is a socialization effect reflecting differ- 
ences in (1) the relationship between the indi- 
vidual and governmental authority that reaches 
well back towards the beginning of this century 
in the cases of Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary, 
including several forms of authoritarian rule 
(Held, 1992). It also reflects (2) the experiences 
of democracy in Spain, France and the United 
States, experiences which tend to take the sharp- 
est edge off fears of democratic muddle, conflict 
and disorder. And (3), in the differentiation 
analysis the curvilinear relationship across the 
scale of democratization clearly shows striking 
increases in the number of significant differ- 
ences among age cohorts in the two countries 
closest to democratization in 1995, Hungary on 
the pre-democracy side and Spain just newly 
on the democracy side. Although generational 
replacement is an obvious factor, we would 
argue that experiences with or close to demo- 
cracy contribute to the liberalizing effect. 
With respect to the characteristics of the 
rule of law ideal that the legal values represent, 
there are different kinds of effects for law con- 
sciousness, rights consciousness, and justice 
judgments. Law consciousness centres on extent 
of adherence to law under different circum- 
stances. Here the moral authority of law is at 
stake because one’s willingness to depart from 
strict adherence depends in part on one’s felt 
obligation to obey. When the moral authority 
of law is specifically invoked, respondents in 
all countries indicate an increased commitment 
to lawfulness. Law’s moral force does not 
appear to have distinctly different effects across 
these populations, however. The variation that is 
documented by the justifiable behaviours scale 
appears tied to the social meaning of particular 
kinds of acts rather than to liberalization. It 
underscores the value of thinking about the 
moral authority of law in both abstract and 
specific terms. In our view, much more needs 
to be done in this area because law conscious- 
ness is an important nut that has yet to be 
cracked. 
The analysis of rights consciousness 
uncovered multiple facets of the rule of law 
ideal in the context of democratization. Popu- 
lations in the East were somewhat lower than 
those in the West in their valuation of rights 
claims but all populations valued rights very 
highly. That is, while there is a higher rights 
consciousness under the older democracies, the 
newer democracies are not far behind in valuing 
the entitlement of individual claimants. And the 
claims are to a broad range of benefits (see 
appendix), perhaps reflecting a notion that 
democratization brings all good things to all 
people. We also found differentiation between 
rights stated without specification of the claim- 
ant (‘right to a job’) and rights specifying claim- 
ants by their social characteristics (women, for- 
eigners, gypsies, minorities). Women fared well 
across the six countries, gypsies and minorities 
would be treated variously depending on the 
country, and foreigners did distinctly less well 
everywhere. On the other hand, when we looked 
at specification of political rights in the context 
of liberty versus order, it became clear that the 
new democracies (Bulgaria, Poland, and 
Hungary) would countenance significantly less 
entitlement to political rights than the older 
democracies. Again, the general enthusiasm for 
rights consciousness is important, but that find- 
ing must be tempered with evidence of 
exclusionary politics across the board and the 
relative willingness to sacrifice political rights 
in the new democracies. 
While this pattern is not surprising, it does 
point up the importance of commitment to the 
rule of law in the process of democratization. 
The ethic of legality implies that the law can 
act as a guiding principle according to which 
contests between rights and duties may be 
resolved. Legality requires reciprocities between 
rights claims and duties that meet the standards 
of public values such as fairness, liberty and 
equality. These values often pose contradictions, 
or at least inconsistencies, in the situations of 
conflict in ordinary life from which legal issues 
and claims arise. In liberal legal ideology, the 
law’s guiding principle is based on the abstrac- 
tion of the individual from social characteristics. 
The decidedly illiberal valuation of rights to a 
job for foreigners, and to a somewhat lesser 
extent for gypsies/minorities, is disturbing. But 
it is perhaps less disturbing in the United States, 
where the established institutions are likely to 
override these biases, than in the new demo- 
cracies, which are without well-established legal 
institutions that might adhere more to the guid- 
ing principle of the law than to partisan or 
prejudicial fears in the populace. 
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The area of justice judgments provides a 
mixed but interesting picture. Our proposed 
calculus of fairness, composed of the relative 
importance of procedural and distributive jus- 
tice balanced by the weight given to commun- 
itarian concerns, clearly indicates that the new 
democracies are more likely to be influenced 
by distributive outcomes and communitarian 
principles than the older democracies. The 
implications of this finding are several, but 
most important for the purposes of this article 
is the shift away from placing the individual 
in the centre of the rule of law ideal. The 
social fairness differences, while not large, are 
statistically significant. The relative impor- 
tance of procedural justice decreases signifi- 
cantly for the East, indicating a completely 
different direction from that consistently found 
in the procedural justice literature from the 
United States (Lind, Huo and Tyler, 1994; 
Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1988). Our find- 
ings raise intriguing questions about the role 
of this kind of calculation of fairness in demo- 
cratization cross-culturally, especially across 
the many cultures in which the individual is 
subordinated to the group in most areas of 
life. While we have not raised the issue of 
market liberalization here, it is important to 
keep in mind that the central role of the indi- 
vidual creates a critical coincidence between 
the law of liberal democracy and the law of 
market capitalism. Cross-cultural research on 
conceptions of responsibility (Hamilton and 
Sanders, 1992) is opening new avenues for 
exploration in this area that it will be 
important to pursue. In the meantime, it should 
be noted that procedural justice - clearly a 
value oriented to the individual claimant - was 
the most highly rated of all the legal values 
across all the countries. 
Our cohort analysis also opened new ques- 
tions. The adolescentlgenerational hypothesis is 
often assumed to be true without empirical evi- 
dence. We found it difficult to identify clear- 
cut distinctiveness in any generational unit. 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, we 
could not make causal inferences or disentangle 
possible alternative explanations for the effects 
we did find. In general, we were not able to 
confirm the adolescent/generational hypothesis 
using these data. The significant difference 
analysis provided an unusual methodological 
tool with which to identify cohort diversity, 
however, because it allowed us to describe 
progressive differentiation in these populations. 
We noted a curvilinear relationship across the 
democratization scale that indicated distinctly 
different amounts of cohort disagreement on 
basic values and social beliefs depending on 
where the particular country was located in the 
democratization process: the newest and oldest 
democracies had the least amount of cohort dif- 
ferentiation; the peaking democracies, Hungary 
and Spain, showed the greatest amount of differ- 
entiation (Figure 1). We also found that elites 
were less likely to show cohort differentiation 
than masses (Figure 2), and elites in the new 
democracies were almost without differentiation 
in their basic beliefs and values. We can only 
speculate that these elites, in countries just 
released from domination by repressive regimes, 
had been forced into relative uniformity over 
time. 
In testing assumptions about the role of 
legal values in the normative attitudinal struc- 
tures of populations that approximate to a con- 
tinuum of democratization, we have raised some 
new questions about socialization processes and 
the liberal legal model. Now, six years after the 
1989 revolutions, public values are still newly 
open for normative definition and affirmation in 
the new democracies. The survey results 
reported here reveal a populace which is gener- 
ally conservative to moderate in its basic social 
beliefs, cautious about democracy but with a 
sense of greater individual entitlement to come. 
The role of the law as protector and facilitator 
of individual entitlement is the great promise 
of the liberal legal model. As democratization 
proceeds, with its increasing differentiation 
across groups by age and education, and the 
conflictful politics that democracy inevitably 
spawns, these populations will experience both 
incitement and excitement. Just as the Western 
world watched with awe the revolutionary 
events of 1989, we await the coming political 
struggles in the hope that legal liberalism can 
play a strong and positive role. We are 
observers of this process in two senses: both as 
supportive bystanders and as scholars. In terms 
of the latter, we hope that this article is only 
the first step towards a more rigorous under- 
standing of the interaction between law and 
culture in democratization. 
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Appendix: Measurement of 
the scales 
Summated scales were constructed for each of 
the following sets of items. 
Legal values 
Lawfulness 
It’s alright to get round the law as long as you 
don’t actually break it. (Disagree) 
The government should have some ability to 
bend the law in order to solve pressing social 
and political problems. (Disagree) 
It is not necessary to obey a law you consider 
unjust. (Disagree) 
Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law 
and solve problems immediately rather than 
wait for a legal solution. (Disagree) 
If you don’t agree with a law, it is alright to 
break it. (Disagree) 
Justifiable behaviours 
Please tell me for each of the following state- 
ments whether you think it can always be justi- 
fied, never be justified, or something in 
between. 
Claiming state benefits that one is not entitled 
to. (Never be justified) 
Not paying all one’s taxes. (Never be justified) 
Buying something a person knows was stolen 
(Never be justified) 
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of 
their duties. (Never be justified) 
Using the company’s equipment or supplies for 
work outside the company. (Never be justified) 
Rights consciousness 
Next I will read through a list of rights and 
freedoms. Please tell me how important these 
rights are to you personally. 
freedom to express your important political 
views 
freedom of religion 
freedom to join and participate in social and 
political groups and unions 
equality in front of (before) the law 
the right to a job 
the right to own land and private property 
the right of foreigners to settle in [country] 
the right to a clean and safe environment 
the right to abortion 
Rights for excluded groups 
While the guarantee to a job may be important 
in general 
foreigners should not be guaranteed a job in 
[country] 
women should not be guaranteed a job in [coun- 
try] 
gypsies/minorities (US) should not be guaran- 
teed a job in [country] 
Social beliefs 
Individualism 
It is more important to do the kind of work 
society needs than to do the kind of work I 
like. (Disagree) 
The most important thing to teach children is 
obedience to their parents. (Disagree) 
People should go along with whatever is best 
for the group, even when they disagree. 
(Disagree) 
We as [nationality] have a responsibility to 
ensure that all our countrymen have the chance 
to a decent life. (Disagree) 
If people are going to live in [nationality] 
society, they ought to be forced to accept 
[nationality] ways and customs (Disagree) 
Dogmatism 
There are two kinds of people in the world: 
those who are for the truth and those who are 
against it. 
A group which tolerates too many differences 
of opinion among its own members cannot exist 
for long. 
To compromise with our political opponents is 
dangerous because it usually leads to the 
betrayal of our own side. 
Of all the different philosophies which exist in 
the world, there is probably only one which 
is correct. 
Social conservatism 
People should try to adapt to the rules of society 
rather than fighting them. 
It is best to accept the flaws of existing auth- 
ority because it is dangerous to try to change it. 
People should not try to change how society 
works but just accept the way it is. 
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Democratization 
Perception of the economy 
How do you think the general economic situ- 
ation in this country has changed over the last 
twelve months? Would you say it has got . . . 
(a lot better) 
How do you think the general economic situ- 
ation in this country will change in the next 
twelve months? Would you say it will . . . 
(considerably improve)? 
How would you say that you and your family 
are . . . (living much better)? 
And what about the next twelve months? Would 
you say you and your family will . . . (live 
much better)? 
And how much does it worry you that during 
the next twelve months you or some member 
of your family will be unemployed? (not at 
all worried) 
Satisfaction with democracy 
On the whole, to what extent are you satisfied 
with the way democracy works in [country]? 
Liberty 
It is better to live in an orderly society than to 
allow people so much freedom that they can 
become disruptive. (Disagree) 
Free speech is just not worth it if it means we 
have to put up with the danger to society of 
extremist political views. (Disagree) 
Society shouldn’t have to put up with political 
views that are fundamentally different from the 
views of the majority. (Disagree) 
Because demonstrations frequently become dis- 
orderly and disruptive, radical and extremist 
Notes 
political groups shouldn’t be allowed to demon- 
strate. (Disagree) 
Procedural justice 
Imagine you had an encounter with someone in 
a government office. When you think about 
such an encounter, how important to you are 
the following factors: 
to have the person at the office listen to my 
story 
to have the person at the office explain 
hisher decision 
to have the person treat me with respect 
to have the person treat me the same as he/she 
treats other people. 
Distributive justice 
Imagine you had an encounter with someone in 
a government office. When you think about 
such an encounter, how important to you is the 
following factor: 
to get what I want 
Relative procedural justice 
Mean procedural justice minus distributive jus- 
tice 
Social fairness 
A fair law is one that has everyone’s agreement. 
It makes sense to follow laws because most 
people do. 
A fair law is one that protects both the strong 
and the weak. 
A law is fair when most people like it. 
* As is the case with all our joint 
publications, this article represents 
a genuine research collaboration 
between the authors, with equal 
contributions. Therefore, neither is 
first or second author. This article 
uses data from a collaborative 
project that grew out of the Law 
and Society Association’s ’Working 
Group on Orientations toward Law 
and Normative Ordering’. Ellen S. 
Cohn, lames L. Gibson, Susan 0. 
White, Joseph Sanders, Joan 
McCord, and Felice Levine were 
responsible for the development and 
implementation of the research 
design. Funding for the project was 
provided by the (US) National 
Science Foundation (SE 13237 and 
SIR 11403). Our European 
collaborators include Chantal 
Kourilsky-Augeven (France), 
Grazyna Skapska, Iwona 
Jakubowska-Branicka, and Maria 
Barucka-Arctowa (Poland), Andras 
Sajo (Hungary), Rosemary Barberet 
(Spain), and Stefka Naoumova 
(Bulgaria). Pam Moore, Kris 
Guffey, Marika Litras, Julie 
Nadeau, John Kraft, and Kimberly 
Smirles provided valuable research 
assistance. 
1. We determined the number of 
significant differences by first 
conducting multivariate analysis of 
variance tests with the five youth 
cohorts (1947, 1956, 1968, 1978, 
1989) as the levels of the 
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independent variable and the legal 
values, social beliefs, and the 
democratization variables for each 
of the six countries (Bulgaria, 
Poland, Hungary, Spain, France, 
and the United States). To divide 
the participants into the five youth 
cohorts, we took respondents who 
were 13-21 years old in 1947 (born 
in 192&1934), 1956 (born in 
1931-1943), 1968 (born in 1947- 
1955), 1978 (born in 1957-1965), 
and 1989 (born in 1968-1976). The 
youth cohort effect was significant 
at the multivariate level for each of 
the three sets of variables in all six 
countries. Then Scheffe post hoc 
tests were conducted on the 
individual variables which were 
significant at the univariate level. 
We then added the total number of 
significant differences for all three 
categories of the variables. 
2. We defined elites and masses by 
years of education. Elites were 
those respondents who reported at 
least some university education and 
masses were those who reported 
either no education or less than 
university education. The only 
exception was in the United States 
where elites were those who had 
completed a university education or 
more (in order to keep the elites at 
less than 50% of the sample). The 
percentages of elites were 12.1% in 
Bulgaria, 10.8% in Poland, 12.6% 
in Hungary, 18.5% in Spain, 23.64 
in France and 36.7% in the United 
States. 
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